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Capital Account Liberalization in Nigeria:
Problems and Prospects
Ayodele Festus Odusola

*

I. Introduction

C

apital account liberalization is one of the lynchpins of globalisation and
it is often seen as an inevitable path to economic development for
developing countries. This is based on the premise that liberalizing
capital account would permit financial resources to flow from capitalabundant countries, where expected returns were low, to capital scarce
countries where expected returns are high. The extant literature is replete with
the potential benefits of capital account liberation. The policy when effectively
implemented, allows resources to flow into the liberalizing countries thereby
reducing cost of capital, increasing investment and promoting economic
growth(Fischer, 1998 and2003; Henry, 2003a).
While capital inflows could provide important resources for economic
development, its surges, reversals and volatility may create new sources of
systemic risks. Until the experience of the past one and a half decades, the main
issue of contention was about timing and sequencing of capital account
liberalization within the context of overall macroeconomic reform or
stabilization. However, the widespread of financial crises across the continents
of the world (with particular attention to Asia and Latin America) brought
some form of concern about whether to even liberalize or not. To some extent,
capital account precipitates inflow of speculative hot money, which is a major
causative factor of financial crises in many countries. Although the argument
of whether capital account liberalization is predominantly beneficial or
harmful remains inconclusive, the consensus is however moving towards the
type of liberalization that throws up minimal development challenges. This
* Dr. Odusola is a National Economist at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) , The
views expressed herein do not represent the views of the institution to which he is affiliated. The author
acknowledges the comments and suggestions ofanonymous reviewers.
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paper examines the problems, prospects and challenges of foreign private
capital flows in Nigeria. To this end, the paper is structured into six parts.
Following the introduction is section two that provides the framework for
capital account liberalization. Section three examines the Nigerian experience
on capital flows while section four highlights best practices from proximate
economies. Section five addresses the key challenges and prospects of
managing effective capital accounts while section six concludes the paper.

II

Framework for Capital Account Liberalization

11.1

Conceptual Issues

In a generic sense, capital account liberalization is about allowing capital to
flow freely into and out of a particular country. This connotes a deliberate
policy that allows domestic businesses to borrow from foreign banks,
foreigners are allowed to purchase domestic debt instruments as well as invest
in the domestic stock market (Henry, 2003 a and b). As defined by Stiglitz
(2002), it entails stripping away the regulations intended to control 1 the flow of
hot money in and out of the country, especially short term loans and contracts
that are usually taken during favourable exchange rate movements. These
regulations could take several forms: direct or administrative control (e.g.,
outright prohibition, explicit quantitative limits, and approval procedures),
indirect or market based controls ( such as multiple exchange rate system,
explicit or implicit taxation of cross border financial flows, and other priceand quantity-based measures) (Ariyoshi, et al, 2000).
Capital account liberalization (CAL) is the process of removing restrictions
from international transactions related to the movement of capital. It can
involve the removal of controls on both domestic residents' international
financial transactions and investments in the home country by foreigners.
Liberalization can apply to both inflows and outflows of capital. Capital
account restrictions can take various forms including: limiting domestic banks'
foreign borrowing; controlling foreign capital coming into the economy;
limiting the sectors or industries in which foreigners can invest and restricting
1

Capital control could also serve other important purposes, including national sovereignty, protecting
national security, and achieving specific social objectives.
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the ability of foreign investors to repatriate money earned from investments in
the domestic economy.
Capital account liberalization can be categorised into two broad categories:
debt and equity. Debt market liberalization occurs when domestic economic
agents (banks, companies and even governments) are free to borrow in hard
currencies from foreign banks to finance investment activities. Experience has
shown that this is more problematic and often very difficult to sustain. The
main danger of this type ofliberalization is that more attention is always given
2
to short-term borrowing • This often generates a mismatch between the term
structure of borrowers assets (which is always long term) and their foreign
currency denominated liabilities (that are usually short term) thereby making
3
the country in question to be exposed to high level ofvulnerability • Whenever
the lenders are reluctant to issue new loans, liquidity problems ensue. If this is
not well managed, it could precipitate the onset of serious financial crises as
experienced in many Asian and Latin American countries in the 1990s.
An emerging consensus on capital account liberalization is that the magnitude
and maturity profile are very important for success. In specific term, the size
and maturity profile of a country's external debt liabilities are compatible with
the magnitude and maturity profile of its assets. Any attempt to disregard this
basic principle could expose the country to vulnerability that could trigger
some deleterious effects.
Liberalization of the stock market is another variant of capital account
liberalization. With this, foreigners are allowed to hold shares in domestic
capital market. Through inflow of foreign funds, stock market liberalization
leads to lower interest rates. Arising from diversification benefits associated
with stock market liberalization, which increase stock market values, equity
premium is reduced thereby leading to lower cost of equity capital (Henry,
2000 and 2003b). The reduction in cost of capital, to a large extent, encourages
firms to expand their operations through increase in installed capacity, i.e.
1

This refers toa loan withamaturityofless than one year
In addition to expansion of existing businesses, reduction in cost of capital arising from stock market
liberalization provides opportunities for businesses that were not profitable before liberalization to
become more profitable after liberalization . .

1
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4

Managing capital account liberalization could be challenging and the
associated benefits are not automatic. Benefits from capital account
liberalization are a function of the soundness of the domestic financial system.
When the financial system is in quagmire or badly managed, many of the
advantages whittle away. Whenever the news of imprudent lending or
corporate insolvency emerges, economic prospects and stock market responds
accordingly. Ordinarily, as a rational economic agent, when this happens,
foreigners and even domestic investors are more disposed to moving their
funds to less risky but high return yielding economies. What are these benefits
and costs? These are examined below.

11.2

Benefits of Capital Account Liberalization

The theoretical benefits of the linkage between capital account liberalization
and the overall economic growth have been well referred to in the literature
(Fischer, 1998; Henry, 2003b; Obadan, 2004; and Le Fort, 2005). The muchmentioned benefit of capital account liberalization is the opportunity of
increasing the array of assets available in the local markets as well as efficiency
and competition in the provision of financial assets. As a corollary of market
competition and efficiency, it promotes preservation of policy disciplines. It
also allows for inter-temporal optimisation and risk sharing through portfolio
diversification. Within the saving-and-foreign exchange gaps theory, growth
benefits abound for developing countries that are traditionally short of capital
through foreign capital inflows. Investment is no longer constrained by
domestic savings. There is therefore the potential for enhanced economic
growth through increased capital accumulation.
Growth could also arise from efficiency gains such as efficient allocation of
resources through financial deepening, exposure to higher standards in
accounting, auditing and disclosure principles. In most cases, prudential
frameworks that tend to enhance the level of efficiency in the financial system
'In addition to expansion of existing businesses, reduction in cost of capital arising from stock market
liberalization provides opportunities for businesses that were not profitable before liberalization to
become more profitable after liberalization
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always accompany capital account liberalization. In addition, increased
international competition can force domestic players to become more efficient,
stimulate innovation and improve productivity. If the distribution of growth
arising from these various sources is well managed, it could spur improved
welfare conditions for the majority ofthe citizens.
Another source of growth and welfare enhancement, as postulated by Wang
(2002), is intertemporal optimisation. This allows for an economy that is
experiencing temporal recession to borrow from foreign economies to
smoothen its consumption stream, which reduces its dampening effect on
domestic aggregate demand. If external debt position is adjudged sustainable,
this contributes significantly to welfare enhancement.
Liberalization of capital account also allows for international portfolio
diversification. Domestic market agents have the opportunity of diversifying
country specific risks, which ordinarily cannot be diversified under capital
account restrictions. However, because most asset transactions in developing
countries are restricted to banking transactions, foreign direct investment
gains from portfolio diversification are often limited to developed countries.
As established by Henry (2003b), the evidence on cross-sectional analysis
reveals that cost ofcapital falls and capital market activities boom when capital
accounts are liberalized. The study revealed that cost of capital fell by 2.4
percent, growth rate of capital stock rose by 1.1 percentage points and output
per capita grew by 2.3 percentage points over a period of five years in 18
5
countries (including Nigeria) that implemented capital account liberalization •
Consequently, investment activities rise as profit maximizing firms reduced
marginal products of capital thereby raising the growth rate of capital stock.
The declining cost of capital and investment booms are the first effect
generated by capital account liberalization. As a direct consequence of growth
accounting framework, investment boom generates temporary increase in the
growth rate ofoutput per worker and the overall growth ofthe economy.
:,Other countries included Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, India, Indonesia, Jordan, Korea, Malaysia,
Mexico. Nigeria. Pakistan , The Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela and Zimbabwe.
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Although the theory of capital account liberalization is about capital
accumulation, the issues of total factor productivity and technological change
do not enter into the story, some proponents have however argued that this
could be a derived or indirect effect. As argued by Obstfeld ( 1994 ), any
economic reform that raises the efficiency of a given stock of capital and
labour will also increase the growth rate of technology. In specific terms,
liberalization may ease binding capital constraints thereby allowing firms to
adopt technologies that could not be financed prior to liberalization. Besides,
it is also possible that increased risk sharing associated with liberalization
could encourage riskier or higher growth technologies.
In a more simplistic way, this policy would enhance stability by diversifying
the sources of funds to developing countries. Such funds assist in bridging the
resource gap that many developing countries often face. The reality however is
that this can only happen in tranquil and stable periods. As experienced in the
post 1997 crisis in Asia and Latin America, banks find it very difficult to lend to
countries in crisis.
Ordinarily, liberalization creates a climate to attract investment both within
and outside the country. Foreign direct investment (FDI) in particular creates
employment opportunities, facilitates the process of technology adaptation
and promotes growth. FDI, for instance, has played important role in the
economic development of countries such as Singapore, Malaysia and China6,
not so much for capital because of high savings rate or for the entrepreneurship,
but for the access to markets and new technology that accompanied such
investments. Foreign capital was translated to growth and development
because these countries were able to check the abuses of foreign investors. This
is not to say a similar thing applies to all countries. The cost in term of
displacement of local industries and predatory pricing could be senous
particularly in countries where there is weak or no competition law.
6

ft is important to note that this is not always the case in all countries. Experience has shown that when
foreign businesses come in they often destroy local competitors with deleterious impact on entrepreneurial
spirit and growth. For instance, the entrance of Coca Cola and Pepsi into any domestic market has
overwhelmed soft drinks manufacturers around the globe. There is hardly any country they entered where
one ofthe domestic companies become a price leader in the market.
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Costs Associated with Capital Account Liberalization

Capital account liberalization is not costless. It does not only overheat the
economy as a result of capital surge and expansion of aggregate demand, it also
increases volatility in prices and exchange rates due to volatile movement of
capital flows and transmission of foreign shocks. The opponents of capital
account liberalization however pose a contrasting view to some of the
arguments raised above. Dani ( 1998) and Stiglitz (2002) argue that capital
account liberalization attracts speculative hot money7 that makes the economy
more susceptible to financial crisis. Due to asymmetry of information in many
developing economies, markets become inefficient and negative effects of
capital account liberalization could manifest in such forms as adverse
selection, moral hazard and herd behaviours (Wang, 2002). In the case of Latin
America and Asia, abrupt outflow of money left behind collapsed currencies
and weakened banking system. To them, the effects on investment, output and
other real variables are apparent and do not have any serious impact on the
welfare. While capital account liberalization does not necessarily lead to
financial crisis or welfare reduction, it is true that high capital mobility can
easily drive an emerging country to be more vulnerable to outside shocks by
complicating macroeconomic management.
Although most of the Latin American economies were emerging from heavy
regulation and control, as argued by Eichengreen (2005) and DeLong and
Eichengreen (2002) the zealous push for capital account liberalization by the
Fund was not as a genuine intellectual and policy conviction that capital
account liberalization could lead to economic transformation. Rather, it was a
way of expanding the political and bureaucratic mandate of the International
Monetary Fund as well as the US Treasury.
Stiglitz tried to point out the dangers of capital account liberalization. He posits
thus (Stiglitz, 2002:65):

7

As defined by Stiglitz (2002: 7), this refers to money that comes into and out ofa country, often overnight,
often little more than betting on whether a currency is going to appreciate or depreciate.

124

Central Bank of Nigeria

Economic and financial Review

December 2006

Whereas the more advanced industrial countries did not attempt
capital market liberalization until late in their development-European
nations waited until the 1970s to get rid of their capital market
controls-the developing nations have been encouraged to do so
quickly.
He argued that developing countries are not equipped to manage what had
proved under the best circumstances to be very difficult and fraught with risks.
The argument that capital account liberalization promotes investment boom is
questionable. In practical sense, speculative money cannot be used to build
factory or create jobs. Loans of short-term maturity cannot be used to finance
long-term investments that often induce growth. In a way that always
constrains the operation and expansion activities ofbusiness entities, firms that
benefit from volatile capital inflows are often advised to set aside in their
reserves an amount equal to their short term foreign -denominated loans.
Evidence abounds in the literature about the danger of capital account
liberalization. In many countries, liberalization of capital account has become
a new source of financial instability, which exacerbated financial disruptions
whenever they occurred. As examined by Arora (2001 :58), " ... financial crises
seem to have been occurring with greater frequency at the same time that the
economies are becoming globalized". Empirical evidence has shown that
capital account liberalization played a very critical role in the financial crises
ofMexico (1994-95), EastAsia (e.g., Malaysia, Korea, Indonesia and Taiwan
in 1997-98), Russia and Brazil (1998), Turkey and Argentina (2001), and
Nigeria in the 1990s (Nordhaug, 2002; Fay and Nordhaug, 2002; Moskow,
2000; Odusola, 2001 and 2002). In explaining the critical role of globalisation
in the vicissitudes of the newly industrializing countries of Thailand, Malaysia
and Indonesia, Fay and Nordhaug (2002:77) posit thus:

Large volumes of volatile foreign short term credit and portfolio
investment have frequently been invested in non-tradable and
assets market speculations, while this hot money and herd
behaviour of international investors increase the risks of
financial crisis.
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While capital account liberalization precipitates financial crisis, when such
crises loom large, large withdrawal of capital by foreign investors and creditors
propagate economic recession in many countries. For example, external loans
and security lending to the financially fragile countries of the East Asian region
declined abruptly from $23.0 billion in the second quarter of 1997 to an
outflow of almost the same amount in the third quarter of the same year and by
the first quarter of 1998, the outflow has reached $35 .0 billion (Kaufman, 2000
and Odusola, 2004). The situation is even worse in private capital flows. Net
private inflows, which were $103.0 billion in 1996, dropped to near zero in
1997 and to an outflow of$28 billion in 1998 (Council of Economic Advisers,
1999). In the case of Thailand, for instance, capital reversal amounted to 7 .9
percent of GDP in 1997, 12.3 percent in 1998 and 7 percent for the first half of
1999 (Stiglitz, 2002). The effects are not limited to this region alone, they are
also high in Latin America and Africa. This point to the fact that the emerging
financial system has become more volatile and this volatility could pose a
serious threat to financial stability in specific and macroeconomic stability in
general.
Another good example of the benefits of capital account liberalization that is
often put forward by its proponents is that foreign banks are necessary for
domestic macroeconomic and banking stability. The reality has shown that the
outcome is not as rosy as predicted. In Argentina, prior to the banking collapse
of2001, foreign banks dominated the financial landscape. The other side of the
story is that they merely lent to multinationals while very big and medium scale
enterprises complained of lack of access to capital. Even when the
government rose to bridge the credit gap, this could not make up for the market
failure. Although the influx of foreign banks in Argentins stabilized the
banking system from total collapse after the 2001 crisis, it did not insulate the
economy from economic turmoil and decline. Foreign banks contributed to
banking stability but created macroeconomic instability. It is easy to create
sound banks (banks that do not lose money to bad loans) by investing in nonrisky and non-real sector activities. The same situation holds for Bolivia when
foreign banks decided to pull back on lending in 2001 during the financial
crisis thereby complicating the macroeconomic environment (Stiglitz, 2002).
The main challenge therefore is not to create normative sound banks but to
create sound banks that are eager to provide credit for real sector growth.
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Le Fort (2005) reveals that credit booms fuelled by capital inflows that
precipitate expansion in domestic aggregate demand which considerably
exceed the potential output endanger macroeconomic stability. This results in
unsustainable high current account deficit, a swing in real exchange rate, and a
vulnerable banking system.
Another cost of capital account liberalization is that the management of
domestic monetary policy becomes complicated. The barometric role of the
central banks becomes relatively ineffective. The subtle form of influence by
the monetary authority often becomes weakened under a liberalised capital
account. Foreign banks are less responsive to policy signals of expanding
credit when the economy needs stimulus and of contracting it when there are
signs ofbeing overheated.
The foregoing shows that capital account liberalization is not costless. It does
not only create macroeconomic instability but could also fuel financial crisis
(banking and currency crises). It promotes high-level speculation and
complicates domestic monetary policy management. Most funds that come
particularly through short-term inflows are not often directed at financing the
real sector of the economy. Other costs include the opportunity costs of
concessions offered by governments, adverse effects on domestic savings,
discouragement of domestic entrepreneurship, adoption of inappropriate
technology, erosion of domestic economy autonomy, and adverse effect on
balance ofpayments.

III.

The Nigerian Experience

Although substantial efforts have been put in place to attract foreign
investment into the country since the attainment of political independence in
1960, the adoption of the structural adjustment programme (SAP) in 1986
augmented these efforts. With a view to setting the pace for capital account
liberalization, the financial system was liberalized in 1987 with the attraction
of many foreign investors. The foreign exchange market was equally
reformed. A more liberalized system replaced the erstwhile regulated one. This
included the Second-Tier Foreign Exchange Market (SFEM) and the
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Autonomous Foreign Exchange Market (AFEM), the establishment of
Bureaux de Change, etc. Other policy initiatives that were aimed at liberalizing
the capital account included the abrogation of the Nigerian Enterprise
Promotion Decree, the introduction of new industrial policy, the Industrial
Development Coordination Committee, the Privatisation and
Commercialisation Decree, and the debt conversion programme which by
June 1997 had approved applications that were worth $2,851.50 million,
among others.
As a matter of fact, most policies on capital flows were directed at foreign
direct investment because portfolio investment is relatively new and still
remains less significant in Nigeria. While FDI is acquired for lasting interest
and to secure effective control of management of the affected enterprise,
portfolio investment aims at benefiting from dividends, capital gains or
interest earnings. Because the latter is more volatile, it makes the effect of
capital reversal detrimental to the recipient economy. Hence, most countries
try to be cautious on outright liberalization. As examined in the earlier section
of this paper, portfolio investment has become a notable feature of developed
and emerging economies of the world. Portfolio flows accounted for
substantial part of the Asian and Latin American capital flows over the last two
decades.
The total inflow of foreign capital, which stood at N25 l .O million in 1970, rose
to N757.4 million in 1975. The zeal with which the government was
encouraging foreign capital waned in the early 1970s because of the
diminutive impact on local enterprises and the economy. Outflow of interest,
profits and dividends on accumulated investment and repatriation of capital
put pressure on the country's balance of payments. In order to protect local
entrepreneurs and reduce the pressure on balance of payments, the Nigerian
Enterprises Promotion Decree of 1972 and 1977 was promulgated. This
Decree bared foreigners from participating in certain economic undertakings
and required indigenous equity participation that ranged from 40 percent to 60
percent in some sectors of the economy. This to a large extent led to the
liquidation of some companies especially in the banking sector.
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Consequent upon this development, cumulative private investment that grew
by 201.0 percent between 1970 and 1975 declined at an annual average of0.3
percent between 1976 and 1978 and by 3.8 percent between 1978 and 1981. As
indicated in Table 1, it grew by 14.3 percent between 1980 and 1985 partly as a
result of the dramatic growth rate recorded in 1982 (it jumped from N584.9
million in 1981 to N2, 193.4 million in 1982). With the introduction of SAP in
1986, a near annual steady growth of9.9 percent growth was recorded between
1986 and 1990. It would be recalled that SAP provided the basis for
deregulating the economy under which a number of institutional, structural
and market reforms were undertaken to open up the economy with a view to
creating the enabling environment for attracting the requisite foreign
investment. In 1988, for instance, FOi-friendly framework was put in place
through the establishment of the Industrial Development Coordination
Committee (IDCC) as embodied in Decree No 36 of 1988. The IDCC
streamlined the multiplicity of institutions responsible for registration and
approval of foreign companies in the country. In addition to the
Commercialisation and Privatisation that removed restrictions placed on
foreign ownership of enterprises in the country, the industrial policy of the
same year also created some opportunities for foreign investment in the
country. These to a large extent accounted for the appreciable average annual
growth of 77.0 percent during 1990-95. The rapid growth of 615.6 percent
experienced in 1995 led to the remarkable annual average growth for the
period.
The year 1995 is often regarded as a year when the most serious commitment
was made in creating a conducive environment towards attracting foreign
private investments into the country. Through Decree 16 of 1995, the Nigerian
Investment Promotion Commission (NIPC) was established with the primary
mandate of promoting foreign private investment in the country. To
complement Decree 16 in removing all forms of impediments to foreign
investments, the Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous) Decree
No 17 of the same year was also promulgated. In addition to this, fiscal
incentives to encourage foreign investment include the 100 percent tax
holidays for 7 years and tax reduction for investors that provided their own
infrastructure and undertook research and development (CBN, 2001 and
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Obadan, 2004). Consequently, cumulative private investment rose from H57,
929.88 million during 1991-95 to Hl43,008.50 million and N188, 943.1
million during 1996-2000 and 2001-2004, respectively. This represented an
annual average growth of 5.9 percent and 10. 9 percent, respectively.
Table 1 also shows the growth rate of the various components of foreign
private investment. As shown in the Table, the growth rate of paid-up capital is
steadier than other liabilities. The former oscillated between 8.0 percent and
49.5 percent between 1980 and 2004 while the latter ranged between -3.9 and
7 55 .5 percent during the same period.
Table 1: Cumulative Foreign Private Investment
(Value and Growth Rate)
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-3.9
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29,479.56
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57,929.88
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755.5
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1996-00

65,927.60

77,080.94
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. . .
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19.0

2.5

10.9

~

'

Source: CBN (2004): Central Bank ofNigeria Statistical Bulletin, Volume 15, December 2004.

As evident in Table 2, the flow of foreign private investment predominantly
favoured the mining and quarrying sector although it experienced some lull
between 1980 and 1990. This notwithstanding, its relative share has been on
the declining trend since 1995. From a share of4 7.5 percent in 1995, it declined
through 2004 to 24.9 percent. Although the share of manufacturing and
processing was at the peak in 1990, it declined to about 23.0 percent between
1995 and 2003 before rising to 41.3 percent in 2004. Clearly; agriculture was
seriously marginalized with a relative share that was less than 1.0 percent
between 1997 and 2004. A major implication of this is that for capital account
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liberalization to be pro-poor, it must be able to expand the sector where the
poor people's economic activities dominate. In the case ~f1:ligeria, agric~lture,
small and medium scale enterprises are pivotal. A similar observat10n of
marginalization is also made for transport and communication, building and
construction, and trading and businesses. However, due to the deregulation of
the communication subsector and the banking consolidation, foreign inflows
into these areas are beginning to rise in recent times.
The role played by the privatisation of public enterprises as a vehicle to
liberalize capital accounts was of particular importance. It created ample
opportunities for foreign firms to come as technical partners during the
privatisation efforts. Cement companies are a good example of this. The
deregulation of the communication sector through the introduction of global
system of mobile telecommunication in 2000 also ushered in many foreign
investors, particularly from South Africa. The same is true for the banking
consolidation of 2004/2005 that attracted $652.00 million from foreign
investors.
The United Kingdom was a major source of foreign inflows up till 1990 when
its contribution ranged between 37.5 percent and 65.4 percent while the share
of USA has equally dwindled since 1975. The share ofUSA's foreign inflows
into the country in recent times is merely above 50.0 percent ofits contribution
in 1975. The rest of Western Europe became prominent when UK's
contribution declined. However, the Western Europe's share has been on the
declining trend. It declined from 64.9 percent in 1995 through 2004 to 34.7,
percent, see Table 3.
Net outflows were not a serious problem until 1989 and 1990 when, for the first
time, the net aggregate outflows were negative. The net outflows rose from
N439.4 million in 1989 to N464.3 million in 1990. A number of factors have
been alluded for this development. First, the deregulation of the foreign
exchange market and the introduction of Bureaux de Change resulted in
substantial outflows. The second factor, as presented by Obadan (2004 ), is the
divestment of investment interests by USA and some European countries from
the Nigerian enterprises perhaps as a result of outstanding obligations not
honoured.
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Figure 1 reveals the pattern of FDI, portfolio investment and other long-term
capital in the country between 1980 and 2004. Non-internalisation of the
country's money and capital market and non-disclosure accounted for why
portfolio investment is relatively a new phenomenon in the country. It did not
feature in the country's balance of payments until 1985. Portfolio investment in
Nigeria comprises transactions in bonds, debentures, promissory notes, equity
investment, preferred shares or stocks, mutual funds, investment trusts and
treasury bills (Obadan, 2004). Net portfolio inflow rose from Nl51.6 million
in 1986 to N4,353. l million in 1987 but declined through 1991. It recorded net
outflows between 1989 and 1998, excepting 1992. It is important to note that
between July 1995 and July 1996, about US$6.0 million foreign portfolio
investment was made in the Nigerian capital market through the Nigerian
Stock Exchange (NSE) for the first time since 1962. Foreign investment raised
through the NSE rose from US$1.14 million in 1995 to US$32,99 million in
8
1996 • From 1999, however, it has been on a rising trend though still remaining
marginal. The rising trend since 1999 resulted from the stable macroeconomic
environment, strong anti-corruption initiative, commitment to economic
reforms especially the deregulation of the telecommunication sector, banking
consolidation, privatisation efforts and the IMF's backed Policy Support
Instruments (PSis ). An important feature of the portfolio investment is the
inherent high level of instability that may not be congenial for macroeconomic
management. Figure 1 shows a good picture of this endemic instability. Figure
2 also provides the trend of the gross inflows of portfolio investment in the
country.

8

For details see Onosode (1997) .
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Figure 1: Dynamics of Net Portfolio Investments
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Table 2: Distribution of Cumulative Foreign Private
Investment by Sectors
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1.3

6.7

39.7

1990

10.5

60.7

3.2

2.3

7.1

16.4

-0.2

1995

47.5

23.2

1

0.3

1.3

2.5

24.2

1996

46.3

24.3

1

0.4

1.5

1997

46.2

24-4

0.9

0.5

3
2.8

24.2

1998

39.3

22.6

o.8

0.5

2.6

6.9

27-4

1999

38.2

23.5

o.8

0.5

2.6

7.1

27.3
26.8

l

23.5

2000

38.5

23,7

o.8

0.5

2.5

7.1

2001

38.3

23.5

0.7

o.6

2.6

7,4

27

2002

37

24

0.7

2.6

7.4

27.3

2003

34.6

25.6

0.7

1.6

2.5

8.1

27.5

2004

24.9

41.3

0.5

1.7

2,1

8.1

21.5

l

Source: CBN (2004): Central Banko/Nigeria Statistical Bulletin, Volume 15, December 2004.
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Table 3: Percentage Distribution of Foreign Private
Investment in Nigeria by Sources
Year ·

··Total(million
naira)

UK(%) ·

USA(%)

· Western

•· Others

Europe(%)

(%)

1970

1,003.2

44.3

22.9

22-4

10-4

1975

1,812.1

37.5

23.4

25.8

13.3

1980

3,620.1

39.3

15.6

30.6

14.5

1985

6,804

52.8

12.6

23.5

11.0

1990

10,436.1

65.4

2.0

14.5

18.1

1995

119,391.6

13.2

15.5

64.9

6.4

2000

157,535.4

20.8

13.9

53.6

11.7

2001

162,343.4

22.0

14.1

52.5

11.8

2002

166,631.6

22.1

13.5

51.8

12.6

2003

178,478.0

23.4

14.2

49.5

12.6

2004

249,220.6

19.7

11.4

36.7

32.4

Source: CBN Statistical Bulletin, Volume 16, December 2004.

In Nigeria, foreign direct investment could either be for the establishment of
new enterprises or expansion of the existing ones through increase in paid-up
capital, profit ploughed back into the business, trade and suppliers credits, and
net liabilities to head offices of the parent companies (usually in the form of
loans, royalties and technology). Foreign capital inflows through newly
established enterprises rose from N27 .9 million in 1990 through 1993 to
Nl,405.4 million but later declined to N292.5 in 1994 partly because of the
political crisis that resulted from the annulment of June 12, 1993 Presidential
election. Over the entire period, investment in machinery and equipment grew
by an annual average of 57. 7 percent while cash in foreign currencies grew by
42.3 percent (Obadan, 2004). Overall, capital inflows through newly
established enterprises remain grossly inadequate.
Generally, the inflow of FDI rose from N212.5 million in 1976 to N735.8
million and N2,452.8 million in 1986 and 1987, respectively. The rate of
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growth during this period averaged 151.5%. The sharp increase was largely
attributed to the implementation of foreign investment policies, particularly
the various components of SAP such as the financial sector and exchange rate
reforms as well as the privatisation policy. The amendment of the 19 5 8 Income
Tax Relief in 1988, which expanded the tax incentives and concessions under
the Pioneer Status, also contributed to this. After the amendment, the pioneer
status entails I 00 percent tax-free period for 5 years for pioneer industries and
7 years for those pioneer industries located in economically disadvantaged
areas. Tax holiday in respect of dividends received by non-Nigerian companies
having not less than 10 percent holding in Nigerian companies for a period of
three years while withholding tax on dividends was also reduced from 15
percent to 5 percent. In addition, 30.0 percent tax concession was given to
companies adhering to local raw materials utilization for five years.
With the Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree of 1988, total inflow of
FDI rose to Nl3,877.4 million in 1989, representing a growth rate of707.7%.
In 1990, it declined to N4,686.0 million. With the promulgation of the Export
Processing Zones Decree No. 34 of 1991, inflow of FDI rose to Nl4,463.l
million, a growth rate of 109.1 %. By 1995, when the NIPC came into
existence, inflow of FDI was N75,940.6 million and later rose to Nl 11,295.0
million in the following year, with an average growth rate of 144.1 %. Total
inflow of FDI from 1997 to 2004 was Nl .3 billion. Figure 2 presents the trend
of FDI from 1980 to 2004. This achievement was possible because of
additional incentives that government put in place which included, but not
limited to:
10 percent tax concession for five years on local value added efforts
particularly to encourage local fabrication in the engineering sector;
2 percent tax concession for five years on in-plant training concession;
10 percent tax concession for five years for companies exporting not
less than 60 percent oftheir products;
20 percent of the cost of providing additional basic infrastructures such
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as road, water, and electricity as tax relief;
100 percent tax holidays for seven years for locating in economically
dis-advantaged places;
Abolition of excise duty with effect from January 1998;
Other export incentives include duty drawback, refund of excise duty
paid on export manufactures, retention of 100 percent of export
proceeds in the foreign currency domiciliary account by non-oil
exporters, tax-free interest earned on export loans, accelerated tax
depreciation and capital allowance for manufactured exports, abolition
of export licence, rediscounting and refinancing facilities, Export
Development Fund (with respect to export promotion activities),
establishment of Calabar Export Processing Zone, the Export
Expansion Grant Fund Scheme (EEGFS), and the Nigerian Export
Credit Guarantee and Insurance Scheme later replaced by NEXIM.
In spite of the policy initiatives introduced by government since 1986 and the
avalanche of opportunities that abound in the country, the performance of FD I
could be adjudged to be low, see figure 2.
As shown in Figure 2, other long-term capital (net) is a major source of deficit
for the balance of payments. What appeared marginal prior to 1995 became
volatile and exceedingly negative after the promulgated NIPC and Foreign
Exchange Decrees of 1995. This is an issue deserving serious attention from
policy makers. This tends to suggest a debt market liberalization problem that
needs to be seriously managed for sustainability. This phenomenon depicts a
situation where long-term debts are used to finance short-term assets. The need
to examine the relevant provisions with a view to realigning this component of
FDI inflows to the health of the economy is imperative.
Other areas of policy concern are the net errors and omissions otherwise called
the unrecorded net flows. What appeared undisruptive prior to 2000 has turned
out to be an economic management challenge since 2000, see Figure 4. This
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tends to suggest that it has become a major source of capital flight in the
country. The monetary authorities and the Economic and Financial Crime
Commission need to direct their searchlights into this direction.
Over the past years, political instability, inhibitive investment policies, weak
macroeconomic fundamentals, and structural weaknesses manifesting in
excessive transaction costs of doing business were considered to be major
impediments to foreign investment in the country. While macroeconomic
stability has been achieved which has improved the global rating of the health
of the economy, structural weaknesses still abound. Poor infrastructure as
manifested in inadequate and costly telecommunications services, erratic and
epileptic electricity supply, inadequate water supply, poor road networks;
corruption and insecurity of life and property, especially the recent
developments in the Niger delta region remains a challenge.
Specifically, the performance is considered to be very marginal given the rate
at which the naira depreciated during the period. However, when compared
with other large economies in Africa (South Africa, Egypt and Algeria),
Nigeria's performance seems bad. Nigeria is next to South Africa. Due to
limited openness in such countries like Egypt and Algeria, they both ranked
behind Nigeria in terms of FDI inflows (Table 4 and Figure 3). On average,
Nigeria accounted for 14.0 percent and 8.2 percent of Africa's FDI inflows in
1996-99 and 2000-03 periods against South Africa's 18.1 percent and 16.7
percent. This to some extent shows that Nigeria still needs to brace up to the
challenges of attracting foreign private capital into the country.
A major conclusion from the foregoing is that capital account liberalization has
not really posed a serious problem to the economy. First, portfolio investment
still remains a new phenomenon with relatively small size. However, things
might change as a result of the consolidation of the banking sector. Second, the
share of FDI in gross fixed capital formation remains relatively small. Between
1998 and 2003, it ranged between 9.2 percent (2003) and 12.2 percent (1998).
Three, net outflow is not yet a serious issue in Nigeria with the exception of the
experience in 1989 and 1990 which came as a result of exchange rate
deregulation during the period. This notwithstanding, both net outflows of
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other long term capital and unrecorded net outflows are posing a threat to
balance of payments. The fact that the costs of incentives put in place might
outweigh the quantum of foreign investment attracted may tend to suggest
limited effectiveness ofthe incentive structures put in place.
Table 4: FDI Inflows in Africa and Selected African Countries
Year

Africa

1996

5331

Nigeria

South Africa

Egypt

1593

818

636

270

120
82

Algeria

Ghana

1997

10919

1539

3817

887

260

1998

9144

1051

561

1076

501

56

1999

11590

1005

1502

1065

507

267

2000

8728

930

888

1235

438

115

2001

19616

1104

6789

510

1196

89

1065

50

2002

11780

1281

757

647

2003

15033

1200

762

237

634
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1996-99

9246

1297

1674.5

916

384.5

131.25

2000-03

13789.25

1128.75

2299

657.25

833.25

97.75

Source: A/DB and OECD (2005) : African Economic Outlook 2004/2005

Figure 2: Foreign Direct Investment, Portfolio and
Other Long Term Capital
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Figure 3: Gross FDI Inflows in Selected Countries
in Africa, 1999-2003
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Figure 4: Unrecorded Net Flows in Nigeria, 1980-2004
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Best Practices from Proximate Economies

The fact that the Nigerian situation has not really posed a serious threat to the
economy does not mean there are no opportunities for the country to learn from
what is happening in other parts of the world. Both the global and individual
country's experiences offer lessons for Nigeria. As a global response to the
vicissitudes of capital account liberalization, the Basel Committee has
amended the capital adequacy framework to promote safety and soundness in
the international financial system by giving special attention to the activities of
large and internationally active banks (Basel, 1999). The modified framework
is now giving greater scope for the use of internal credit ratings and portfolio
models in establishing minimum capital. Although the Basel modification did
not change the capital adequacy ratio from 8.0 per cent, many countries are
9
now considering the possibility ofincreasing the ratio •
The new framework has developed some measures that now influence banks'
international activities. Some of these include using external risk assessment
prepared by rating agencies in establishing risk weights for sovereign
borrowers 10. Attaching weights to over-the-counter derivatives and securitized
assets is another specific aspect of the new framework. There is also a
provision for prudential oversights over highly leveraged institutions. In
addition, sound practices for loan accounting, credit risk disclosures and bank
transparency will help in mitigating the impact of capital flows in any
economy.
Prudential guidelines are not costless. If not carefully designed and applied,
they could have unintended and undesirable consequences by providing
distorted incentives that result in excessive risk-taking in specific areas, as well
as facilitate contagion. It could also lead to self-fulfilling downturn in the
9

Increasing capital adequacy has the advantage ofmakingfinancial system failure less likely and when they
do occur, the private sector bears the major cost and also reduces incentive for banks to gamble for
resurrection. On the other hand, higher capital adequacy ratio raises banks' cost thereby reducing the level
of intermediation. To some extent, large differences in capital adequacy ratio between countries reduce
competition thereby reducing capital.flows in countries with higher ratios (Ariyoshi, et al, 2000,p : 34-5).
10
1n the 1988 Accord, sovereign risk weights are based on a generalized approach, i.e., whether a country
belongs to the OECD or not.
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economy in terms of capital withdrawals to other economies where the
incentives are higher.
Mistakes many countries made on prudential guidelines during turbulent
capital flows is that they fail to strike appropriate balance between reducing
threat of excessive risk taking and containing freedom of institutions to take
the normal risks inherent financial intermediation. To this end, monetary
authorities should ensure that regulation against capital flows is not done at the
expense of weakening the role of prudential policies in maintaining safety and
soundness of domestic financial system.
Countries like India and China were able to insulate their economies from the
contagion of the late 1990s because their current account liberalization mostly
emphasized opening up of the economy to foreign direct investment and
portfolio equity investment. These countries to a large extent reduced
significantly reliance on volatile short-term debt flows. Other factors include
maintaining flexible exchange rate system and adequate stock of foreign
exchange reserves.
Arising from liberalization of capital account, many countries experienced
very volatile movement of capital in the late 1990s. This, to a large extent,
weakened the monetary policy autonomy in directing monetary policy towards
domestic objectives, impaired the stability of the monetary and financial
system, and added undue pressures on foreign exchange and inflation. This
informed the reintroduction of prudential policies and capital control. For
instance the use of capital controls to limit short-term capital inflows was
experienced in such countries as Brazil ( 1993-97), Chile ( 1991-98), Colombia
(1993-98), Malaysia (1994) and Thailand (1995-97). The following shows
case studies from some countries on the policy responses to capital account
liberalization.
Brazil: In changing the composition of capital account from short to long-term
inflows, Brazil restricted or banned investments in certain assets, increased the
11
entrance tax for some portfolios, and used other measures to increase the
11

To injluence the level, maturity and composition ofportfolio, differentiated tax rates was adopted in Brazil. Taxes
were imposed based on their inverse relationship with maturity ofcapital especially during th e Mexican crisis in 1995.
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maturity of permissible investments. Other measures include banning the use
of short-term capital for fixed income investments, restricting foreign
investors access to market derivatives, raising the minimum maturity level
especially minimum maturities for all currency loans to three years. During
this period, Brazil experienced massive sterilization of accumulated reserves
with substantial fiscal costs in terms of fiscal deficits, exchange rate
appreciation and current account deterioration. In fact, most of these measures
were circumvented through financial engineering and sophistication of the
financial market that reduced the cost of circumvention relative to the
incentive to circumvention thereby necessitating additional restrictions.
12

Chile: Arising from the strengthened external sector between 1984 and 1988 ,
there was a surge in capital inflow from 1989. The boom in capital inflow in
Chile presented a classical case of monetary policy dilemma (Ariyoshi, et al,
2000). During the structural and macroeconomic reform in Chile, the
monetary authorities assigned monetary policy a domestic inflation target
while exchange rate was assigned current account target. However, when the
capital account was fully deregulated, it became very difficult to set monetary
and exchange rate policies independently.

At the onset, government sterilized foreign exchange intervention and
13
tightened fiscal policy that imposed substantial cost on the central bank • In
response to this, selective controls on capital inflow were imposed in June
1991. Some of these involve imposition of20 percent unremunerated reserve
14
requirement (URR) on foreign borrowing, a minimum stay requirement for
direct and portfolio investments from abroad, regulatory requirements for
'' The current account deficit was cutfrom 11 percent ofGDP in /984 to 1 percent in /988 and the economy grew at an
average of5. 7 percent over the period.
1
' This is in the form ofthe difference between the interest cost of sterilization and return on foreign assets, which was
estimated to be about 1percent ofGDPper annum in the 1990s ( Ariyoshi, et al 2000).

"The imposition of URR, a market based capital control and a variant of Tobin tax, served multiple
purposes. These are to discourage short term inflows without discouraging long term foreign investment;
to reduce the risks faced by institutions intermediating on these type of investment and to increase the
autonomy ofthe monetary institutions by minimizing the effects on the exchange rate of tight monetary
effect as well as reduce the burden ofmonetary policy dilemma (Ariyoshi, et al 2000). Ab initio, URR was
only charged on debt flows but was later extended to non-debtflows such as trade credit,foreign deposits
and some foreign direct investment that are speculative in nature when they became a major channel of
short term capital inflows.
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domestic corporation borrowing from abroad, and extensive reporting for
banks for external transactions (Ariyoshi, 2000 and Le Fort, 2005). These were
complemented by further liberalization of capital outflows, widening of
exchange rate band and continuation of tight fiscal policy. When the 20 percent
URR was becoming less effective, it was raised to 30 percent but was later
5
reduced to 20 percent1 when the contagion effect of the Asian crisis
substantially reduced the flow of short-term capital in the region. As shown in
Le Fort ( 1999), URR altered the composition of capital in Chile substantially.
The share of medium- and long-term capital increased from 23 percent of total
16
inflows in 1990 to 62 percent in 1997-98 • Figure 5 further supports the
finding of Le Fort particularly with net portfolio flows and foreign direct
investment responding appropriately to the policy changes.
The Chilean experience on prudential framework presents a good case study in
that it gave credence to the need to strengthen the financial system, adoption of
sound macroeconomic policies especially fiscal policy stance that moved from
excessive deficit to surplus condition and flexible exchange rate system. To
reduce the heat of capital inflows on the system, gradual capital outflow
liberalization was also encouraged. One of the factors that contributed to the
success made in Chile is the development of prudential framework for the
financial system which established high disclosure standards, stringent rules
for loan classification and provisioning, strict limit on connected lending and
on banks exposure to foreign exchange risks, clear procedure for correction of
liquidity or solvency problems and strict compliance of all banks to the Bank
for International Settlements for capital adequacy ratio. These contributed
substantially to the sound health of the financial system 11.
A major conclusion from the Chilean experience has been that capital controls
15

This was further reduced to 10 percent and Opercent in 1998 when the contagion effects from the Asian
crisis was significantly reduced. URR was focused on large transactions and individual foreign exchange
transactions ofless than US$200, 000 were exempted (Le Fort, 2005: 11).
16
Quantitative evidence on the effectiveness of URR is inconclusive partly because of conflicting official
statistics on capita/flows.
17
For instance as at March 1999, the level of non-performing loan was as low as 1.68 percent while
provision for bad loans was at a comfortable level of 12 7 percent. Th e financial system maintained a
capital adequacy/eve/ of11.5 percent.
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are an integral component of the overall economic reforms programme and
that the country recognised the significance of financial sector reform quite
early in terms of establishing prudential guidelines and sound credit culture in
the financial system.
Colombia: Following the comprehensive structural and economic adjustment
programmes that covered trade system, capital account system, exchange rate
system, banking sector, privatisation, and strong regulatory framework
undertaken by government, Colombia also experienced a boom in capital
inflows in the 1990s. Private capital inflows for instance rose from 0 .2 percent
of GDP in 1990 to over 7 percent in 1997 with an annual average of about 4
percent between 1990 and 1997. As obtained in Chile, prudential guidelines
that entailed sound banking regulation and supervisory framework, domestic
strategy for financing public sector, tight credit conditions and emphasis on
foreign direct investment were integral part of the economic reform
programmes.
Although the surge in capital inflows helped in financing the widening current
account deficit, it however created some destabilizing effects on the system.
Apart from exerting upward pressure on the exchange rate it also raised a
serious concern about external competitiveness of the country's tradable. This
generated some policy responses from government. An immediate policy
response was the partial sterilization the ripple effects of inflow through
aggressive open market operations (OMO). Apart from the cost on the
financial balance of central bank, which was as high as 0.8 percent of GDP in
1991, the aggressive OMO also raised the domestic interest rate, which further
attracted short-term foreign capital inflows into the country. To stem the tide of
rising interest rate, an expansionary fiscal policy was adopted which weakened
the effectiveness of monetary policy. As a response to this development, the
local currency (peso) was devalued, restrictions on capital outflow were eased,
and import liberalization was also accelerated.
In spite of these measures, capital inflows were still on the rising trend.
Consequently, far-reaching policies were introduced. A 10 percent
withholding tax on transfers and non-financial private services was introduced
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in July 1992. Another form of capital control was introduced in September
1993 with the emergence of URR18 for all external borrowings. To mitigate the
effect on exchange rate, a crawling peg regime was introduced in early 1994
with the bandwidth set at±7 percent and the rate of crawl based on the expected
inflation differential with major trading partners (Ariyoshi, et al, 2000).
These measures were able to change the structure of external debt stock from
medium - and long-term share of total debt stocks of 40 percent in 1993 to 70
percent in 1996. However, net private capital flows remained very strong (it
rose from2. l percent of GDP in 1992 to 5.9 in 1997).
Malaysia: Malaysia experienced an unprecedented level in both short- and
long- term capital surpluses between 1990 and 1993. While the short-term
capital as a ratio of GDP rose from 1.2 percent to 8.9 percent during the period,
the ratio for the long-term capital stood at 5.7 percent in 1990 and 8.2 percent in
1993. As pointed out by IMF (1995), economic fundamentals accounted for
the inflow of long-term capital while interest differential accounted for the
short-term flows.
The monetary authorities was faced with the trade off of either solving the
problem of inflation by maintaining high interest rate or address the
destabilizing effect of short-term capital by reducing the interest rate
differential against Malaysia. The latter option was considered important by
the monetary authority and a combination of monetary and exchange rate
policies were adopted. Sterilization was considered as the best option but its
implementation was very costly due to weak financial structure in the system
and interest rate also rose. Hence, capital flows rose, the ringgit became more
appreciated with its destabilizing effects on trade and investment. Besides,
government lost control over monetary aggregates and inflation and the
financial system became unstable.

"The URR was adjusted many times to reflect the current reality with a view to making it better focused. Generally, it
was imposed on external loans with maturity of 18 months or less. Certificate on URR facility is originally
denominated in foreign currency but redeemable in local currency after 18 months.
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Figure 5: Foreign Investment Flows in Chile, 1990-98
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To arrest the level of macroeconomic and financial instability in the system,
direct control measures which were primarily aimed at limiting short-term
capital inflows in the form of bank foreign borrowing and ringgit deposits by
bank or non-bank foreign customers were introduced in 1994. Among the
measures include: prohibiting residents from selling Malaysian money market
securities of less than one year maturity to non-residents; commercial banks
were prohibited from engaging in non-trade related bid-side swaps or forward
transactions with non-residents; imposition of ceilings on banks net liabilities
excluding trade related and foreign direct investment; and commercial banks
were mandated to place with the central bank the ringgit funds of foreign
banking institutions and maintained non-interest yielding accounts.
One clear message from this set of policies is that the control measures were
meant to be a temporary one. Hence it was discontinued at the end of 1994 but
the prudential guidelines remained in place. The measure led to depreciation of
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the ringgit and correction of the stock market. Due to sharp narrowing of
interest rate, short-term capital inflows were curtailed. Monetary aggregates
decelerated and exchange rate became stable. Important lessons from the
Malay's experience is that control was effective because of consistent mix of
monetary and exchange rate policies; and because of continuous strengthening
of the prudential regulations.
Thailand: Capital account liberalization took place quite early in Thailand.
Promotion of free capital flows (especially portfolio and equity investment)
started as early as 1985 but became more pronounced between 1990 and 1995
while outflows were liberalized only gradually during 1990-92 and 1994.
Banks were not restricted from foreign borrowing but were placed on net open
position limits. Residents, on the other hand, could be contracted freely but
they were subject to the provision that proceeds should be repatriated through
authorised banks or placed in foreign currency account.
The liberalized capital market coupled with the pegged exchange rate since
1984, created wide interest rate differential in favour of the country. This
created strong incentives for interest rate arbitrage and speculative activities,
which resulted in high volatile short-term capital inflows; this was estimated at
over 60 percent as at 1993. Consequently, the Thai economy, in spite ofbeing
noted for tight fiscal policy, became overheated from the middle of 1993. This
manifested in the form of demand pressure, which resulted in high inflation
and increased current account deficit.
In the face of fixed exchange rate policy and limited indirect monetary
instruments, monetary policy became quite complicated. The main policy
responses were combined monetary policy, prudential guideline and market
based capital controls. To reduce the inflationary impact of the inflow, interest
rate was raised in March 1995, credit plan was extended to cover large finance
companies and related institutions, loan-deposit ratio was reduced whenever it
was above the accepted average, and sterilization operations was stepped up.
Specific measures were put in place in August 1995 to control capital inflows.
These included: establishment of asymmetric open position limits for shortand long-term positions; establishment of a reporting requirement for banks on
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risk control measures in foreign exchange and derivative trading; and a 7.0
19
percent reserve requirement on non-resident baht accounts with less than 12
months maturity and on finance companies' short term foreign borrowings.
Banks were also restricted from extending credit to non-priority sectors during
the period. These measures generated desired results at the early stage. The
effects were however short-lived because of the decline in US interest rates.
Consequently, capital account surplus rose from 8.5 percent of GDP in 1994 to
13.1 percent in 1995. While short-term capital rose from US$7.4 billion in
1994 to US$12.7 billion in 1995, long-term capital (mostly portfolio
investment) also increased from US$4.6 billion to US$8.1 billion during the
same period.
Following, the need to reverse increase in capital inflows, the 7 percent reserve
requirement was extended to non-resident baht borrowing with a maturity of
less than one year and to new short-term offshore borrowing of maturity ofless
than one year by commercial and Bangkok International Banking Facility
(BIBF) banks. This, apart from reducing the net flow of capital substantially
also reduced the composition of capital inflows. Short-term capital inflows fell
from 62 percent in 1995 to 32 percent in 1996 (Ariyoshi, et al 2000). The share
of long-term loans of BIBF rose from 14 percent in 1995 to 34.3 percent in
1996, reduced the non-resident holding ofbaht accounts as well as reduced the
share of short-term debt to total debt stock from 50 percent to 43 percent during
20
the same period • Some key lessons are discernible from the country's
experience. The effectiveness of the measures was hindered because reforms
in the financial system lagged behind capital account reforms. The goal of
liberalizing current account position cannot be maximized when the interest
rate differentials between the liberalizing country and its trading partners or
neighbouring economies do not align or reduce substantially. Besides, capital
controls are not substitutes for prudential guidelines and sound
macroeconomic policies.

19

20

The reserve is kept with the central bank.

It is instructive to note that the measures were unable to reduce substantially credit to unproductive
sectors with no foreign exchange earning potential.
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Key Challenges and Prospects

One of the major arguments of capital account liberalization is that it allows for
fund diversification and it bridges the domestic saving-investment gaps.
Unless a guided approach as exhibited in Malaysia in 1997 is undertaken, the
pro-cyclical nature of foreign capital may not lead to the desired economic
transformation. In practical sense, capital flows out during recession, when
they are mostly needed, and flows in during a boom, when the need for it is
relatively lower thereby exacerbating inflationary pressure.
The challenge of ensuring macroeconomic stability especially monetary and
exchange rate policies is commonplace in the literature. Large and persistent
inflows complicate the implementation of monetary policy, as is the case in
Thailand. The boom in capital inflows could also present a classical case of
monetary policy dilemma. In the face of high capital account liberalization, it
becomes difficult for monetary authorities to assign domestic inflation
targeting to monetary policy while at the same time assigning current account
targeting to exchange rate policy. Setting monetary and exchange rate policies
independently is al ways a herculean task.
Financial institutions are a major stakeholder in international transactions.
Because they accept cross-border and foreign currency deposits, initiate
external borrowings; make foreign loans and investments, have branches
across borders, and intermediate cross border transactions, they are often
exposed to excessive risk taking. Rapid inflows and sudden reversals could
impact on the health of the financial institutions and systems. These shocks if
not properly handled could trigger financial panics and systemic crisis as
experienced in Malaysia and Thailand in 1997 /8, Spain in 1992 and Venezuela
in 1994-96. The recent consolidation in the country further increases the
likelihood of exposure if prudential guidelines are not fully enforced and
monitored. This is more demanding given the fact that capital inflows into the
banking system could fuel credit expansion, foreign exchange risks and
21
maturity mismatches in foreign currencies •
21

As argued by Johnson and Otker-Robe (1999), capital account liberalization could introduce additional
risks (credit risk, market risk, and liquidity risk) that may increase the magnitude or complicate the
management ofrisks that banks typically faced in their domestic activities.
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For capital control to be effective, it has to be comprehensive and forcefully
implemented. China and India provide a good example of this up till the 1990s.
It is important to note that irrespective of the effectiveness of capital account
control at the initial stage, it often loses effectiveness over time as markets
exploit the potential loopholes in the system to channel the 'undesired' inflows.
It is only in sophisticated financial system ( as experienced in Brazil) and strong
enforcement capacity (as is the case in China and Chile) that the incentives
could be reduced appreciably as experienced in Brazil. Colombia also reduced
circumvention by subjecting some trade credits to URR. One major lesson
from the implementation of capital account liberalization is that it should be
approached slowly and very cautiously. Many mistakes were made in most of
the countries that have implemented capital account liberalization. This relates
to mistake of sequencing and spacing. For instance, forcing liberalization
before safety nets are put in place, before adequate regulatory framework and
before the country could withstand the adverse consequences of sudden
changes in market sentiments do not produce the desired results. In practical
sense, when the financial system is characterised by structural weaknesses,
capital account liberalization poses significant risks, hence it should be of
lower priority in the short-term.
An emerging reality from the experience on capital account liberalization over
the past one decade is that there has been a good deal ofleaming. The major
lesson from the experience is that capital account liberalization is a particular
aspect of the larger process of economic and financial development. Emerging
countries have learned that the regulation of capital flows in and out of a
country is only one aspect of the larger task of economic and financial
regulation and financial markets regulation is only one part of the broader
process of economic and financial development. Capital account liberalization
can occur naturally in the course of economic and financial development.
However, because the development of financial markets differs in different
countries, one-size-fits-all advice regarding capital account liberalization is
unlikely to be productive. It would be imprudent to attempt to apply the same
advice regarding the structure and sequencing of policies toward the capital
account. Hence, premature capital account liberalization, initiated before the
development of domestic financial markets can be dangerous and
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counterproductive (Eichengreen, 2005)22. Clearly, addressing a complex issue
like policy toward the capital account in a very simplistic manner often
suggested by the international financial architecture could only lead to more
frustration and deleterious effect on developing countries' economies.
Prudential guidelines have been used extensively to mitigate the effect of
capital account liberalization in many countries of the world. Prudential
guidelines, if well implemented, are capable of strengthening the capacity of
the financial system to withstand volatile market conditions. Argentina and
Chile have made substantial progress in using prudential guidelines in
mitigating the effects of destabilizing capital flows. Evidence from successful
countries have shown that establishing and maintaining prudential standards
rests on some fundamentals, namely, public regulation and supervision,
internal practices and control, and market discipline. The monetary authorities
would have to examine these very critically and determine to what extent
Nigeria has adhered to these pillars before the benefits of prudential guidelines
on cross border transactions can be maximized. It is important to note that even
in advanced economy, managing prudential guidelines are weakened to some
extent by the rapid innovations in financial technology. The fact that
management and supervision of financial system cannot keep pace with the
technological innovation, timely identification of financial risks becomes
compromised.

VI.

Conclusion

Capital account liberalization has not posed a serious problem to economic
management in Nigeria. Portfolio investment still remains a new phenomenon
with relatively small size while the share of FDI inflows and net flows as a
proportion of gross domestic product between 1990 and 1997, for instance,
remained at 4.4 percent and 1.2 percent. In fact, net outflow is not yet a serious
issue in Nigeria. The effect of banking consolidation might change the
scenario if appropriate prudential guidelines are not put in place. However, net
outflows of other long-term capital and unrecorded net outflows are posing a
nEichengreen was a former Senior Policy Advisor at the International Monetary Fund.
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threat to balance of payments. The fact that the costs of incentives put in place
might outweigh the quantum of foreign investment attracted may tend to
suggest limited effectiveness of the incentive structures put in place. While a
wide spread between the deposit and lending rate may suggest an inefficient
financial system, it is also important to address the structural impediments to
foreign investment in the country. Issues such as adequate provision of
electricity, water, roads as well as fight against corruption and maintenance of
security oflife and property are vital to addressing this.
This notwithstanding, Nigeria has a lot to learn from other countries that
experienced vicissitudes of capital accounts. Experience across the globe
indicates that various policy responses accompanied surge in foreign capital
inflows. Depending on the nature of inflows, policy options often given
serious consideration include sterilization through OMO, increase in reserve
requirements, fiscal tightening and greater exchange rate flexibility. Other
policy options are further trade liberalization, removal of restrictions on capital
outflows, and tightening of restrictions on capital inflows. An emerging
consensus is that none of these brings the desired solutions because each of
them involves significant costs or brings different policy challenges. Evidence
from different studies however shows that unremunerated reserve
requirements was successful in changing the composition of inflows towards
longer-term maturities thereby reducing countries' vulnerability.
No matter the extent of effectiveness of capital account control, it often loses
its steam over time as markets exploit the potential loopholes in the system to
channel the 'undesired' inflows . An alternative approach to managing the risks
associated with capital flows is not to impose administrative control, but to
limit the vulnerability of the economy to the risks associated with the flows
through the application of prudential framework to the financial institutions.
On the other hand, liberalization of capital account does not just happen by
sentiment or by coercion. Rather, some economic prerequisites are needed. It
should be an integral element of a comprehensive economic reform
programmes with some form of sound regulatory framework. Greater
exchange rate flexibility and more stable and robust financial system are
needed before capital account liberalization is embarked upon.
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An emerging issue is how to manage the risks of international capital flows
which to a large extent has led to the adoption of capital controls in many
countries, particularly in controlling the volume, composition and volatility of
such flows. The facts emerging from the experience of capital control as a way
of reducing the effect of liberalization are that no single measure is effective
across the country; selective controls targeted against some range of
transactions, as opposed to comprehensive measures, are easily circumvented;
administrative capacity and level of financial development matters in
achieving results; sound macroeconomic policies, strong prudential policies
and effective supervisory capacity of the monetary institutions matter. The
sequencing of financial and external liberalization has also become a critical
factor in the literature. Financial sector reform and consequently financial
stability are precursor of capital account liberalization. External sector
liberalization has serious implications on the entire financial infrastructure
such as market development, governance, prudential regulations and
supervision, and monetary operations.
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